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BEWARE: THE FARM CRISIS IS NOT OVER 
Spdng's arrival heralds the annual regf'neratlon of the farm 
community's hope and optimism for a better year. However, during the 
spring of 1987, this annual surge in optimism has been unusually vibrant 
because the farm crisis seems to be receding. Both net cash farm income 
and net farm income before inventory adjustment, which is more stable on 
an annual basis than the usually cited net farm income after inventory 
adjustments, established nominal dollar records in 1986 (Table 1). 
Furthermore, these two measures of farm income increased at co11pound 
annual rates of 11.7 and 16.8 percent respectively between 1984 and 1986, 
a sharp contrast with the 1978-1984 growth rates of 2.9 and 2.1 percent. 
In addition, farm debt excluding farm households, which totalled $199 
billion on December 31, 1984, is currently forecast at $158 billion for 
December 31, 1987. Thus, while some farmers, especially those burdened by 
heavy debts, continue to experience difficult times, current trends in 
farm income and debt provide support for the current optimism. 
However, we believe that, far from suggesting an optimistic future, 
the causes of the current optimism point to a continuation of the farm 
crisis. No one wants to think about a continuing farm crisis just when it 
seems relegated to the history books, but, to be honest, moat farmers, 
agricultural policy makers, and agricultural economists were caught off 
guard by the emergence of the farm crisis during the early 1980s. We 
suggest no one should be caught off guard by its continuance. Therefore, 
we address the economic causes of the current optimism, the difficult 
times they foretell, and a few implications of the continuing crisis. 
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Econo•ic Causes of the Financial I•prove•ent 
Interaction of three economic factors have underpinned the farm 
sector's financial improvement since 1984. The first is declining farm 
expenses. Total expenses including farm households decreased from $142 to 
$125 billion between calendar years 1984 and 1986 (Table 1). Reasons 
include (1) declining prices for production inputs -- the index of prices 
paid for production inputs on a 1977 basis declined from 155 in 1984 to 
145 in 1986, (2) declining interest expense-- from $21 billion in 1984 to 
$16 billion in 1986 because of lower interest rates and reduced debt, and 
(3) declining usc of inputs less intensive use of inputs per acre and 
fewer planted acres because of larger land set-asides and withdrawal of 
land fro• farm production altogether. 
The second factor is government price and income programs. Direct 
government transfer payments to farmers plus net Couodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) loans for grains increased from $8 to 20 billion between 
1984 and 1986 (Table 1). As a statistical aside, CCC net loans are added 
to direct payments because, to farmers, CCC loans are a free put option to 
sell (to the ~overnment) at the loan rate. CCC loans are generally taken 
out when market prlce is less than the loan rate, and, thus, support the 
market price. Therefore, for a given year, government support for the 
farm sector include both direct income transfers and the price enhancing 
effect of the CCC loan program. An approximation of total government 
support can bt~ obtai ned by adding net CCC loans to direct income 
transfers. Lastly, because a CCC loan more closely represents the sale of 
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a commodity (for a guaranteed minimum price) than a tradiUonal loan, in 
the discussion which follows farm debt and assets exdutie CCC loans. 
The sum of litOVernment puyments and loans basically remained constant 
in 1985 and 1986, but the composition changed. Net CCC loans declined 
from $11.8 to $8.3 billion while government payments increased from $7.7 
to $12 billion. This changing mix is projected to continue in 1987 with 
net CCC loans currently estimated by the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) at $0.5 billion and direct payments projected at $15-17 billion. 
The shifting mix reflects (1) the increase in unpaid land set asides 
contained in the 1985 farm bill and the 15 percent paid land diversion in 
effect for 1987 feed grain crops, both of which reduce the amount of 
surplus grain that potentially becomes collateral for CCC loans and, 11ost 
importantly, (2) the differential reduction in loan rates and tar1et 
prices set forth in the 1985 farm bill. 
Under the 1985 farm bill, the Secretary of A&'ricul ture may reduce 
loan rates for feed grains and wheat by up to five percent per year. The 
Secretary also has discretionary authority to reduce loan rates an 
addi tiona! 20 percent per year. This discretionary authority is 
applicable only for a given year and must be reinvoked the next year. Por 
these com11odi ties, the 11aximu11 possible reduction in loan rates was 
invoked during the 1986 and 1987 crop years. Laatly, for cotton and rice, 
a 11arketin&' loan was established by the 1985 farm bill. 
In contrast to loan rates, the Secretary of Agriculture can not 
reduce target prices until the 1987 crop year for cotton and rice and the 
1988 crop year for feed grains and wheat. By 1990, the last year ot the 
198e farm bill, target prices can be reduced by 9 to 10 percent depending 
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on the COJIJiodity. Thus, the differential timing and potential magnitude 
of loan rate and target price reductions provided in the 1985 farm bill 
and invoked for the 1986 and 1987 crop years bas resulted in a projected 
doubline of direct government payments between 1984 and 1987. 
The third economic cause of the fan sector's improved financial 
health is the profitability of the livestock sector. The livestock 
sectors's profitability can be approximated by the ratio of livestock and 
livestock product prices to feed grain and hay prices, the major input 
into livestock production. This ratio bas surged from 1.01 in 1984 to 
1.11 in 1985 to 1.41 in 1986 to 1.75 during the first five months of 1987. 
As a comparison, the ratio averaged 1.10 over the 20 year period 1967-
1986. The sharp increase since 1984 reflects in large part the 
coincidence of low production/high price points in the pork and beef 
production cycles and the policy decision to reduce feed erain loan rates. 
Reflecting the increasingly profitable feeding •argin, net cash income of 
poultry, dairy and •eat ani11al farms increased from $16.8 billion in 1985 
to a preliainary USDA est111ate of $20.6 billion in 1986, a 23 percent 
increase. 
In suaaary, the 1985 farm bill peraitted the Secretary of Agriculture 
to reduce loan rates and target prices but •oderated the potential size 
and rate of decline in target prices relative to loan rates. The farm 
bill also increased land set asides requlreaents. These policy changes in 
coabination with good weather, a decline in oil prices, and lower interest 
rates substantially iaproved the protttability of the livestock sector and 
supported the inco•e of crop far11ers throuah increased direct government 
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payments and through lower input prtc<~s. which were caused in part by 
reduced demand for inputs due to increased land set asides. 
Why the Financial Iaproveaent and thua Current Optiaiaa 11 Teaporary 
What does the future hold for the three economic causes of recent 
financial strength? As concerns production expenses, the laree increase 
in government land set-asides and permanent exit of land durine the 1986 
and 1987 crop years appears to have nearly balanced 1987 production and 
consumption. Thus, the need for additional land set-asides or exit of 
land from the farm sector should, at the least, be smaller in the future. 
In addition, the April 1987 survey of input prices found that prices tor 
production inputs were slightly higher than in April of 1986. Further 
declines in input prices may occur because of delayed reaction to the 
decline in oil prices since 1985, but current evidence suggests the 
decline in input prices will moderate at least in the short run. On the 
other hand, interest expense should continue to decline as farm operators 
retire debt. In conclusion, a reasonable short term outlook would be for 
continued decline in farm expenses but at a slower pace than occurred 
between 1984 and 1986. 
Turning to government programs, because loan rates can decline more 
than target prices between the 1987 and 1990 crop years, the perai tted 
decline in target prices does not necessarily imply a decline in direct 
government payments to farmers. But, the decline in target prices does 
imply lower net income for crop farmers unless supply and demand 
conditions warrant market prices in excess of taraet prices. The latter, 
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however, is considered unlikely by most experts. A reasonable estimate of 
the potential decline in ct•op faraers' income can be obtained by 
multiplying 1987 direct payments to farmers by nine percent, the projected 
decline in targ"et prices. (Due to the tiaing of far• program payments, 
1987 ia the first year that will fully reflect the budgetary impact of the 
1986 reduction in loan rates.) This multiplication yields $1.4 billion. 
Note, the decline will be a decline in net income since target prices 
substantially exceed the cost of production. 
Turning to the livestock sector, if equilibrium means anything, it is 
reasonable to assume that the livestock sector can not maintain its 
current, historically high returns. A simple exercise will be used to 
de11onstrate the potential i111.pact of a return to "normal" profit levels: 
1. Livestock and livestock product prices will decline due to 
increasing supplies stiMulated by current high profits. 
2. As mentioned above, in 1986 the ratio of livestock and livestock 
product prices to feed grain and hay prices was 1.41. 
3. If feed grain and hay prices remain at their 1986 value (98 on a 
1977 index scale) and if the ratio of livestock and livestock 
product prices to feed grain and hay prices returns to its 1967-
1986 average of 1.10, livestock and livestock product prices will 
decline 24.7 percent (1.41 x 98- 1.10 x 98)/((1.41 x 98 + 1.10 x 
98) /2). 
4. Using a price elasticity of demand for livestock and livestock 
products of - 0.55, a 24.7 percent decline in price would be 
assoclated with a 13.6 percent increase in quantity of livestock 
and livestock products. (The elasticity was derived by weighting 
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the retai 1 elasticities estimated by Huang for major retail 
livestock and livestock product groups by the proportion or 1985 
livestock cash receipts accounted for by the corresponding farm 
leve 1 livestock or livestock product. Thus, the elasticity 
estimate is crude.) 
5. Therefore, livestock sector cash receipts are estimated to 
decline by 14.4 percent from 1986 levels (1 - ((1 - 0.247)(1 + 
0.136))), which reflects the partial offset of a lower price by 
increased quantity. 
6. Livestock sector cash receipts are currently estimated by USDA at 
$71 billion in 1986. A 14.4 percent decline translates into 
$10.2 billion. Since no government income-maintenance programs 
exists for livestock producers, the decline in livestock cash 
receipts wi 11 largely translate into an equivalent decline in 
livestock sector profits. 
Obviously, the analysis is simple. Production of the various 
livestock products will not expand at the same rate. Thus, prices will 
decline at different rates. More importantly, dairy, which accounted for 
26 percent of livestock receipts in 1985, has a price support program. 
Nevertheless, the 1985 farm bill permits the Secretary of Agriculture to 
lower dairy price supports from the current $11.35 pet· hundredweirht to 
$9.60 per hundredweight by 1990 should CCC purchases exceed IS billion 
pounds each year. The above analysis implies such a reduction is likely. 
The decline in dairy price supports would total 17 percent or almost 70 
percent of the decline projected for all livestock and livestock products. 
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On the other hand, Huang's estimated elasticities are retail 
elasticities. The elasticities faced by farmers would be more inelastic, 
which laplies an even greater decline in livestock sector profits. 
Aa iaportant as the maanitude of the decline in livestock sector 
incoMe is its timing. Clearly, the sector will not return to equilibrium 
in 1987. Nevertheless, current prices for poultry products are below a 
}lear aao and current futures price quotes for beef and hogs suggest at. 
least a five and fifteen dollar decline respectively by year's end. The 
behavior of the ratio of livestock and livestock product prices to feed 
arain and hay prices since 1967 suaaest it will be at least 1989 before 
equilibriuM is reached and it may be as late as 1991, The longer the time 
before equilibriuM is reached, the longer the farm community has to react 
to lower livestock prices. Most iaportantly, the longer the adjustment 
period, the areater the opportunity for livestock producers to "get their 
house in order" by using livestock profits to retire debt. 
In auuary, aiven the crude nature of this analysis, farm income 
could decline somewhere ln the ranie of $10-15 billion from its 1986 level 
over the next two to four years as tareet prices and livestock profits 
decline. It should be emphasized that major changes in farm policy or 
several years of weather related production problems either in the u.s. or 
overseas could significantly alter the projected decline. 
Iapact of the Projected Par. Inooae Decline on Para Financial Stress 
Table 2 presents a summary of selected fJnanctal statistics for the 
u.s. farm sector from \940 throuih 1986. The data is averaged to smooth 
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annual variations. Several well-known facts are documented: the growth 
In residual income to assets and, consequently, the increase in farm asset 
values from 1940 to 1980, the real capH al losses incurred during the 
1980s as the rate of income return to assets declined and as the rate of 
increase in residual income to assets slowed, and the more than doubling 
of the debt-asset ratio. 
In addition to providing a historical perspective, Table 2 can also 
be used to gain insights into the present and future financial condition 
of farming. For example, a commonly used model for estimating the value 
of an asset is the bid-price model. Basically, it values an asset 
according to the discounted future jncome the asset is expected to earn. 
Factors that affect an asset 1 s bid price include the initial income earned 
by the asset, the rate of change expected over time in the income earned 
by the asset, the expected rate of inflation, the real rate of interest, 
and the rate at which income and cap! tal gains are taxed. For an 
excellent discussion of these factors and their impacts upon the bid price 
for farmland see Barkema. 
As Barkema points out, a change in the initial income earned by an 
asset results in a proportionate change in the asset's value, assuming the 
other factors which affect the bid-price model remain constant. This 
observation is utilized in this analysis because the forecasted decline in 
residual income to assets results from a movement to economic equilibrium 
associated with a decline in government income supports for grains and the 
return of the livestock-feed price ratio to its 1967-1986 average values. 
In other words, the decline in residual income to assets is a one time 
adjustment to equilibrium. Furthermore, since the decline in incoae is 
10 
expected to occur over a two to four year period, the other factors which 
affect the bid price are less likely to change than if a longer period of 
change in income was being analyzed. 
Turning to the numbers, for 1986, residual income to assets is 
currently estimated at $31.9 billion. However, a $10 to $15 billion 
decline in farm sector profitability is projected. Using the $10 billion 
figure, residual income to farm assets becomes $21.9 billion. This 
translates into a 31 percent decline in residual income and, therefore, 
through the bid-price model a 3l percent decline in farm asset values. 
Again, it is worth noting that the projected decline in asset values only 
reflects the projected decline in farm income due to a decline in 
govern11ent income supports for grains and the return of the livestock-
feed price ratio to its 1967-1986 average value. 
Currently, USDA projects non-CCC, non-farm household asset values at 
$692 and $697 billion as of December 31, 1986 and 1987 respectively. The 
closeness of these estimates after five years of steep decline reflect the 
be 11 cf that the decline in farm asset values 1 s over. However, the 
projected decline in residual income to farm assets will push asset values 
lower. Applying the projected 31 percent decline in residual income to 
far• assets to the December 31, 1987 asset value yields a farm asset value 
ot $481 billion. 
Turning to the farm debt issue, what is the implication of the 
decline in farm asset values for farm debt? An estimate of debt 
conaistent with a given asset level can be obtained by using a specific 
debt·asset ratio. For this analysts, the average debt-asset ratio during 
the 1960s and 1970s, 16.1 percent, is used. It may be on the high side 
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because the decline in asset values during the ~arly 1980s mHY make farm 
asset investors more conservative borrowers than during the 1960& and 
1970s, when farm assets appreciated in value. 
Applying the debt-asset ratio of 16.1 percent to the estiaated 
December 31, 1987 as&tlt value of $897 billion yields a farm debt estimate 
of $112 billion, excluding farm household and CCC debt. Since the 
preliminary USDA estimate for December 31, 1987 is $144 billion, this 
simple exercise suggests that add! tional debt liquidation is needed at 
current farm asset and income levels. This conclusion is consistent with 
the fact that USDA is currently forecasting a decline in non-farm 
household, non-CCC debt of $14 billion during 1987 while projecting a $5 
billion increase in the value of corresponding farm assets. 
The projected decline in farm debt becomes even more ominous when the 
debt-assel ratio is applied to the projected asset value of $481 billion 
consistent with the projected decline in farm income. 
becomes $77 billion. 
The debt estimate 
While the projected decline in farm asset and debt levels is large, 
two factors will moderate the decline and its impacts. First, most 
research has shown that changes in asset values lag changes in the 
residual income to assets. Thus, the projected decline in asset values 
(and farm debt) could take five to ten years to complAte. Secondly, 
eighty to ninety percent of the projected decline in residual inco•e to 
fann assets will be accounted for by the livestock sector. Yet, as of 
December 31, 1987 farm real estate is projected to coMprise 74 percent of 
non-farm household, non-CCC debt. Thus, the decline in farM aaaeta will 
be moderated by the difference between the distribution of the projected 
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income decline and the distribution of farm assets among the various farm 
subaectors. However, examination of the 1982 C~nsus of Agriculture 
reveals that farms with more than 1000 acres account for 24 percent of 
livestock receipts, and, more broadly, farms with 260 or more acres earned 
63 percent of livestock cash receipts. A reasonable assumption concerning 
current economic behavior among farm operators with livestock operations 
ts that profits from the lJvestock operation are being used to support 
land purchases and cash rent values. Thus, as livestock sector profits 
decline, ability of these operators to support land values will decline. 
In auamary, additional substantial declines in farm assets and debt 
levels are forecast. This analysis is too simplistic to forecast specific 
numbers, but it does suggest that the decline in farm asset values could 
range aa hirh as 20 to 30 percent at' current values and the decline in 
farm debt could ranae as high as 40-50 percent of current values. The 
percent decline in debt is areater because additional debt liquidation is 
needed to make debt levels consistent with the current level of farm 
assets. One clear implication is that current estimates for assistance to 
the Para Credit System (about $6 billion) are too low. Other implications 
of the continuing farm crisis for the structure of farming and the 
politics of farm progra•s are discussed in the next two sections. 
Structural Iaplicatione of the Continuina Para Criaia 
The most comprehensive picture of farm stress is provided by USDA's 
annual far11 cost and returns survey. Table 3 pr«:sents data from the 
survey for 1985. A farm under stress is defined as one which had a debt-
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asset rfttio greater thun 40 percent on January 1, 1986 nnd had a negative 
~ash flow for the farm household during 1985. A morH restrictive 
definition is also used -- a negative household cash flow and a debt-asset 
ratio greater than 70 percent. The cash flow measure contains allowances 
for depreciation, pdncipal repayment, family living expenses, and off·-
farm income. 
Most discussions of farm stress have centered on smaller and medium 
size farms. However, when viewed on a proportionate basis, farms with 
gross farm sales over $250,000 are experiencing substantially more stress 
than farms with sales under $40,000 and almost as much as farms with sales 
of $40, 000 to $249,999 (Table 3). The continuing farm crisis will 
exacerbate the stress experienced by these largest of farms, especially 
those wl th sales over $500,000. As discussed previously, livestock 
operations will be particularly hard hit in the coming years. Data from 
the 1982 Census of Agrjculture reveals that farms with sales over $500,000 
are substantially more dependent than the average farm upon receipts from 
livestock and livestock products (Table 4). Furthermore, since USDA 
estimates that on December 31, 1985, farms with gross sales over $500,000 
accounted for 22 percent of the non-CCC farm debt, excluding operator 
households, farm lenders could face even more stress in the future due to 
the large amount of debt owned by the largest farms. 
This analysis suggests that the little discussed post~1982 decline in 
number of farms with gross sales over $500,000 should continue. Between 
1982 and 1985, USDA's estimate of number of farms with sales greater than 
$500,000 has declined from 30,000 to 27,000. This reverses a trend which 
probably had been in place since World War II. It should be noted that 
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because tota 1 number of farms also declined I proportion of farms with 
sales over $500,000 remained constant at 1.2 percent. 
The other farm sales category with greater than average dependency on 
livestock sales is farms with sales under $101000 (Table 4). As livestock 
and livestock product prices decline 1 the declining gross receipts of 
small farmers may push them below the $11000 threshold necessary to 
qualify as a farm. Therefore, the number of farms could decline 
substantially in the coming years simply for definitional reasons. 
More broad! y, the decline in cash receipts, both from livestock and 
crops, implies declining farm number in all gross farm sales categories. 
Already, between 1982 and 1985 number of farms with gross sales over 
$100,000 has declined from 294,000 to 287,000. Therefore, it would appear 
that just as inflation in farm prices during the 1970s became an issue in 
the structure of agriculture, deflation in farm prices during the 1980s 
will become an equally important question in the structure of agriculture. 
In summary, as measured by gross farm sales, a downward shift in the 
size of farms is expected. The decline in farm size wJ 11 be most 
significant for farms with over $500,000 in gross sales. In addition, a 
substantial exit of the smallest farms is expected due in part to the 
current definition of a farm. The overall decline in farm size in 
combination with the expectation that the greatest impact will be felt by 
the smallest and largest farms suggests that the proportion of farms which 
are categorized as commercial farms will probably increase but that the 
proportion of farms with sales over $500,000 will probably decrease. 
15 
Political Iaplications of the Continuin~ Fara Crisis 
The major argument for the lower loan rates contained in the 1985 
farm bill was the nPed to become competl tive 1n world markets. While 
exports have improved, the improvement to date has not been as robust as 
many had hoped. However, the lower loan rates have substantially improved 
the profitability of the U.S. livestock sector. In some respects, the 
profits being generated today by the livestock sector are similar to those 
that were generated by the U.S. crop sector during the 1972-74 grain boom. 
Therefore, the 1985 farm bill, as currently admini stared, can easily be 
thought of as the "Full Livestock Production Bill of 1985". 
This is not a historical artjfact. The seeds for the 1985 farm bill 
were sown in 1983 and 1984. As Table 1 illustrates, at that time the 
profitability of the livestock sector was under stress. The stress was 
caused by increasing feed grain prices, which in turn were caused by the 
drought of 1983 and by the payment-in-kind land diversion program of 1983. 
Furthermore, as Table 1 reveals the ratio of livestock to feed grain 
prjces was below the 1967-1986 average every year from 1980 through 1984 
except 1982. Quite naturally, livestock producers -- particularly beef 
and pork producers -- surmised that high grain prices were a major part of 
their problem. Therefore, it was not surprising that livestock producers 
became major policy actors in the formation of the 1985 farm bill. They 
were instrumental in defeating mandatory supply controls for crops, which 
would have substantially increased the cost of feed, as well as in 
supporting reductions in loan rates. 
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This brief history bPgs an important question. What happens when 
livestock prices react, as they must, to the existing profits and decline, 
causing stress in the livestock sector? It wJ 11 be difficult for 
livestock producers to argue that high loan rates for feed grains (and 
soybeans) caused their financial stress. At the same time that livestock 
producers' prof 1 ts come under stress, income supports to field crop 
farmers will begin declining under 1htl 1985 farm bill. This convergence 
of economic stress will take several years to materialize but it can 
clearly materialize by the time the 1990 farm bill is debated. The result 
could be stronger support for mandatory supply controls, particularly if 
export and/or n~w uses demand has not Jncreased sufficiently to propel the 
grain sector into profitability. 
Why would livestock producers be more supportive of mandatory supply 
controls? First, poultry producers would gain relatively more with 
mandatory supply controls, the reason being their feed effidency 
advantage over red meat producers. (The differential iapact of price 
supports upon the different livestock sectors is one of the least-
understood and least-researched issues in the current po 1 icy debate.) 
Secondly, Many livestock producers are still grain producers of some 
significance. If both the livestock and field crop sectors are under 
stress due to low prices and profitability, producers would probably favor 
increasina: prices in one part of their operations. Thus, operators of 
aixed enterprise farms should be more receptive to mandatory supply 
cont rola than they were ln 19M. Lastly, political pressure for som£~ for11 
of dJrect t'ed«~ral aRsistanctl may build within tho livestock comaunity. 
Given budgetary liaitations, direct federal assistance would appear to be 
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posslb1P only with cuts in government aid to crop prodll('t•rs. The only 
politically viable cut in a situation of overall farm stress would be to 
reduce income payments to fif'ld crop farmers by inercasing Joan rates. 
While the above discussion is conjectural, it does SUigest that the 
attempt to rapidly expand exports by substantially reducing loan rates and 
thereby ward off mandatory supply controls, may instead have established 
the seeds of economic adaptation which will lead to the political 
implementation of the opposed program. Such an event would obviously be 
an ironic delight to historians of policy. 
Su•aary, Conclusion and I•plicationa 
Optlmism abides in farm country at present for the farm crisis of the 
1980s appears to be coming to an end. However, the crisis is not over. 
Declining government income and price supports and the increasing 
production of livestock and livestock products in response to the current 
profits jn the livestock sector foretell more hard times. 
This stress will bring further dec! ines, probably substantial, in 
farm asset values and the need to liquidate additional, again probably 
substantial, farm debt. Thus, current estimates of financial assistance 
for the Farm Credit System are underestimated. Significant structural 
changes are also likely -- number of farms will decline, in part for 
definitional reasons, cash receipts per commercial farm will decline, and 
the largest farms wi 11 become the focus of the next round of farm 
financia 1 stress. Lastly, the continuing crisis will likely inviiorate 
the forces supporting mandatory supply controls. 
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Given the potPntial effects of the continuing farm crisis, we believe 
continaency discussions and planning are needed. Failure to consider the 
worst while hoping for the best is management by blinders. We hope the 
forecasts in this article do not come true, for the pain will be immense 
and the image of economics as the dismal science will be reinforced. But 
to ignore the potential for a continuing crisis is to lose valuable time 
in which to develop a sound policy that can reduce the paJn of adjustment 
to economic hardship. 
to which we appefll. 
It is this humanitarian side of the dismal science 
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Table 1: Selected Indicators of the Financial Status of Production 




Net Expenses Product 
Net Cash Government Including Prices to 
Farm Farm Payments Farm Feed Grain 
Year Income a Income & Loansb Household a: Hay Prices 
Rill ion $ - - - - -
1978 23.3 33.1 3.1 103.2 1.23 
1979 22.4 33.4 0.5 123.3 1.29 
1980 22.4 34.2 1.7 133.1 1.09 
1981 20.4 32.8 5.0 139.4 1.01 
1982 24.0 36.8 12.6 140.7 1. 21 
1983 23.9 37.1 8.5 139.5 0.99 
1984 26.4 39.3 7.6 141.7 1.01 
1985 31.6 44.0 19.5 136.1 1.11 
1986c 36.0 49.0 20.1 125.1 1.41 
1987c 33.0 50.0 16.5 120.0 1.75d 
a Net farm income before inventory adjustments. 
b Government payments and loans are the sum of direct government payments to 
farmers plus net Commodity Credit Corporation loans for the year. 
c Net farm income, net cash farm income, production expenses and government 
payments and loans are U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) preliminary 
estimates for 1986 and the midpoint of the forecasted range for 1987. 
d The price ratio is based on the average of prices reported by USDA for 
January through May. 
SOURCES: USDA. Agricultural Statistics: 1982. United States Government 
Printing Office: Washington, D.C. 1982. 
USDA. Agric:ultural Statistics: 1986. United States Government 
Printing Office: Washington, D.C. 1986. 
USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service. "Aarlcultural 
Prices." Pr 1(5-87). May 29, 1987. 
USDA, ERS. Agricultural Outlook. AO .. l31, June 1987. 
USDA, ERS. Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector: Nationpl 
Financial St!mmary, 1985. ECIFS 5-2. November 1986. 
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Table 2. Selected Fara Sector Financial Statistics, United States, 1940-1985.a 
Real 
Residual Real Debt/ Income/ Capital 
Total Total Income to Capital Asset Asset Gains/Asset 
Year Debtb,c Assetsb,c Assets Gains Ratio Ratio Ratio 
-------------billion dollars----------- ------------percent------------
1940-1949 7.9 74.3 4.5 1.7 10.6 6.1 2.3 
1950-1959 14.6 138.9 4.5 2.9 10.5 3.2 2.1 
1960-1969 32.9 211.7 6.2 5.2 15.5 2.9 2.5 
1970-1979 81.9 489.9 15.7 30.8 16.7 3.2 6.3 
1980-1985 179.7 930.8 20.3 -61.0 19.3 2.2 -6.6 
1986 166.6 723.1 31.9 __ d 23.0 4.4 d 
a. Excludes the operator household accounts. 
b. Debt and asset used for a given year was the average of beginning and ending debt and asset 
reported for the year. 
c. Excludes Coaaodity Credit Corporation loans. 
d. Not available. 
Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. Agricultural Outlook. AO 
131. June 1987. 
u.s. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service. 
Far• Sector: National Financial Summary, 1985. ECIFS 5-2. 
Econo•ic Indicators of the 
November 1986. 
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Table 3. Financial Stress of Far• Houaeholda by Fara Size, United States, 
January 1, 1986. 
Farms with Negative Farms with Negative 
Cash Flow for Farm Cash Flow for Farm 
Gross Farm Household All Household 
Sales 0/A >70% 0/A >40% Farms D/A >70% D/A >40% 
-----Dollars----- ------------1,000------------ ----percent----
<40,000 24.3 66.1 928.1 2.6 7.1 
40,000 - 99,999 22.5 50.2 285.5 7.9 17.6 
100,000 - 249,999 22.1 40.0 225.8 9.8 17.7 
250,000 - 499,999 5.5 11.5 78.5 7.0 14.6 
500,000 + 2.5 4.5 32.4 7.7 13.9 
All Farms ** 77.5 173.2 1 ,551. 0 5.0 11.2 
* 0/A: Debt/Asset. 
** Individual components may not sum to the all farm totals due to rounding. 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Financial 
Characteristics of U.S. Farms, January 1, 1986. Agriculture Information 
Bulletin Number 500. August 1986. 
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Table 4: Proportion of Salea Accounted for by Selected Co .. odities, by Gross Para 
Salea, United States, 1982. 
Gross Farm Sales 
Less 
Than $10,000- $40,000- $100,000- $250,000- All 
Coamodity $10,000 39,999 99,999 249,999 499,999 $500,000+ Farms 
- Percent 
Grains 20.7 37.6 40.0 37.3 3l. 7 10.1 27.6 
Other Crops 22.3 18.7 13.1 13.0 18.1 28.7 19.6 
Livestock & Live- 57.0 43.7 46.8 49.7 50.2 61.2 52.8 
stock Products 
Total a 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
8 Total may not add to 100 due to rounding. 
Source: u.s. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1982 Census of 
Agriculture: United States -Summary and State Data. Volume 1, Part 51. 
AC82-A-51. October 1984. 
